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MUTUAL MISTAKE OR EXCUSE: 
WHICH APPROACH TO PURSUE WHEN SEEKING 
JUDICIAL RELIEF FROM CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS ON THE 
BASIS OF SUPERVENING KNOWLEDGE? 
Gregory Crespi*
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 2
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When a person seeks to be relieved from their contractual obligations on the basis 
of supervening knowledge of a fact existing at the time of contracting that has rendered 
their performance impracticable or even impossible, and/or has frustrated their purpose 
in entering into the contract, they would appear to have a choice between asserting a 
mutual mistake enforceability defense or instead asserting one or more of the 
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose excuse defenses. Do they in fact 
have this choice, or does each of these approaches for obtaining judicial relief have its 
own distinct scope of application, with little if any overlap? If there are circumstances 
where a person does have this choice, which approach is likely to be more promising as 
the primary means of seeking relief?
There is, unfortunately, a relative absence of clarifying case law on this question, 
and this brief article considers the guidance provided by Sections 152 and 266 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the associated Official Comments. The article 
concludes that where there is a choice available between the two approaches the question 
as to which one to most aggressively pursue, rather than only plead secondarily in the 
alternative, turns upon the definition of “materiality” that will be applied by the court with 
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Methodist University. J.D., Yale Law School, Ph.D., University of Iowa.
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2 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
regard to the mutual mistake defense. The mutual mistake defense approach is likely to be 
the more promising tact in all instances, although perhaps only marginally so if the court 
applies the most stringent materiality criterion somewhat ambivalently suggested by the 
Official Comment to Restatement (Second) Section 152.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assume that two persons have entered into a contract with one another. Assume also 
that at the time of contracting they each reasonably believed that a certain possible event 
had not occurred. That event had already taken place, however, and the contracting parties 
WKHQODWHUOHDUQHGRIWKLVDVLWXDWLRQFRPPRQO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKHLUREWDLQLQJ³VXSHUYHQLQJ
NQRZOHGJH´RIDIDFWH[LVWLQJDWWKHWLPHRIFRQWUDFWLQJ$VVXPHQRZWKDWRQHSDUW\WRWKH
contract then seeks judicial relief from their contractual obligations because their 
performance has been made significantly more burdensome by the event²perhaps enough 
more so to be made impracticable or even impossible²or because their principal purpose 
in entering into the contract has been substantially frustrated by the event, or both.1
Given supervening knowledge of an existing fact that has these adverse 
FRQVHTXHQFHVIRUDSHUVRQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHREOLJDWLRQVDQGRUIRUWKHDELOLW\RIWKHFRQWUDFW
to satisfy their purposes there appear to be two plausible arguments that this person could 
offer in an attempt to obtain judicial relief from their obligations. One argument would be 
that the circumstances meet the criteria for judicial relief on the basis of a mutual mistake 
as to a fact existing at the time of contracting.2 The other argument would be that the 
circumstances meet the criteria for relief from contractual obligations because a fact that 
was unknown to both of the parties at the time of contracting gives rise to either an 
impracticability or impossibility or frustration of purpose excuse defense.3
Both the mutual mistake and excuse defense theories appear on their face to fit this 
simple hypothetical situation equally well; they clearly have at OHDVWD³VXEVWDQWLDODUHDRI
VLPLODULW\´4 Where both approaches appear to be potentially viable, one would think that 
the mutual mistake theory would in general be the better approach to pursue, given that it 
would appear to be much easier to demonstrate WKH³PDWHULDOLW\´RIWKHPLVWDNHDVWKDW
                                                          
 1. That person could be a defendant in a breach of contract action, or the plaintiff in an action seeking either 
rescission or reformation of the contract. I will hereafter refer to the person asserting a mutual mistake defense 
or an excuse defense in an attempt to reduce or eliminate their contractual obligations as the ³party seeking 
relief.´
 2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating, ³[w]here a mistake of 
both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a 
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party 
unless he bears the risk of mistake under the rule stated in Section 154´). 
 3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(1)±(2) (stating, ³[w]here, at the time a contract is made, 
a party¶s performance under it is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to 
know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that 
performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary . . . . Where, at the time a contract 
is made, a party¶s principle purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no 
reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty of 
that party to render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary.´). 
 4. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc. (ALOCA), 499 F. Supp. 53, 70±72 (1980) (stating, ³In broad 
outline the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose resemble the doctrine of mistake . . . there is 
a substantial area of similarity between the three doctrines´).
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2019] MUTUAL MISTAKE OR EXCUSE 3 
defense requires, than it would be to meet the very demanding eligibility criteria for any 
of the several excuse defenses that I will later discuss.5 But is it really that simple? Do the 
two approaches overlap whenever supervening knowledge of an existing fact has the 
significant consequences noted above, thus always favoring assertion of the mutual 
mistake defense? Or do these approaches instead each have largely separate and distinct 
areas of application, with only limited overlap, with the appropriate tact to take in seeking 
relief depending on the presence or absence of certain other factors? And in those instances 
where there is overlap, at least in the limited sense that the several common threshold 
requirements of each of the two approaches are met, what other factors might suggest that 
a particular approach would be the most promising? 
I have been teaching introductory contract law at the Dedman School of Law at 
Southern Methodist University for almost thirty years. Over that time, I have always called 
WRP\VWXGHQWV¶DWWHQWLRQWKHIDFWWKDW, under the circumstances of supervening knowledge 
of an existing fact that has the impact described above, we have the unusual situation of 
two different mitigating doctrines, based on different underlying rationales, that each 
appear to apply as a basis for the party prejudiced by the fact obtaining relief. This point 
unfortunately comes up towards the end of the spring semester when I am scrambling to 
try to complete the two-semester contracts course sequence coverage, and my time is 
unusually tight. As a result, I have always rather superficially and cavalierly told my 
students that if they need to later address this question on behalf of their clients they should 
³FKHFN Whe probably rather sparse collection of mutual mistake and excuse defense 
SUHFHGHQWVWKDWH[LVWLQWKHUHOHYDQWMXULVGLFWLRQ´WRVHHZKLFKWKHRU\ZRXOGDSSHDUWREH
more promising as a means of obtaining relief, given the specific facts of their case, and 
that in most instances the mutual mistake approach is likely to be the more promising tact 
because of its less demanding requirements, and I leave it at that. I have now decided that 
it is time for me to give this question a little more thought so that I can provide students 
with a more complete and accurate discussion of the choices that lawyers will face under 
these circumstances the next time that I cover this material in class. 
In this brief essay, I will first consider whether there is any basis in the law for 
JXLGLQJDSHUVRQ¶VFKRLFHEHWZHHQDVVHUWLRQRIWKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHRUDVVHUWLRQRI
the relevant excuse defense, under those supervening knowledge circumstances that 
potentially satisfy the elements of either defense, in an attempt to obtain judicial relief 
from their contractual obligations.6 I will then consider whether the legal principles that 
                                                          
 5.  
A second distinction between the [mutual mistake and impracticability] doctrines, however, makes 
mistake appear the more attractive argument. A party who claims relief for mistake must show that 
the mistake had a material effect on his performance. . . . To obtain relief for impracticability, on the 
other hand, the party must show that the event had made performance impossible or nearly so. . . . 
Thus, a party arguing mutual mistake has the advantage in that he need not show that performance 
has become impracticable, but need only show that the balance of the exchange was materially 
affected. 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Julia L. Brickell & Stephen P. Chawaga, Relief for Mutual Mistake and Impracticability, 1 
J.L. & COM. 1, 27 (1981). 
 6. There is, of course, no reason why a person seeking relief could not plead both of these theories as 
alternative bases for relief, and this is often done. As a matter of argumentative strategy, however, it is usually 
more effective to first argue the more plausible theory that advances one¶s case before turning to less persuasive 
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4 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
now guide this choice are justified. 
II. MUTUAL MISTAKE V. THE EXCUSE DEFENSES 
The ideal source of authority for choosing between the mutual mistake and the 
excuse defense approaches as a means for obtaining relief under supervening knowledge 
circumstances would be the judicial opinions handed down in those cases where a person 
has asserted both a mutual mistake defense and an excuse defense as alternative bases for 
relief under those circumstances, where both approaches satisfy the several threshold 
criteria they share that I will later discuss, and where the court has then granted relief under 
one theory but denied it under the other theory. Unfortunately, I have not been able to 
locate any such cases. There is one relatively well-known 1980 case that I will refer to 
extensively in this article in which a federal district court discussed at length the mutual 
mistake approach and both the impracticability and frustration of purpose excuse defense 
approaches, and then granted relief under each of these several theories,7 and there are 
likely to exist at least a few other such cases as well.8 In addition, there are many opinions 
in which courts have denied both mutual mistake and excuse defense arguments for relief. 
But I have not located any cases which allow relief under one approach but reject the other 
approach when they have both been advanced as alternative theories, and that would thus 
suggest fact-specific grounds for choosing between the two approaches. The paucity, if 
not complete absence, of such cases suggests that any meaningful distinctions that can be 
drawn between these two approaches as to their relative merits and proper scope of 
application will be rather subtle. In the absence of clear case law, let me now turn to the 
guidance provided by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
A. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Framework 
If one compares the Restatement (Second) of Contracts treatment of the mutual 
mistake defense with its treatment of the several excuse defenses under supervening 
knowledge circumstances, one can see that the drafters of that document had in mind that 
these two approaches should have somewhat different primary areas of application, but 
with some overlap as well. The position taken appears to be that under most (but not all) 
circumstances either one or the other of these two approaches would be better suited to 
                                                          
alternative theories, if those other theories are convincing enough to even merit being argued at all, and to do this 
one must first assess which approach is more likely to prove successful. 
 7. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 65. In that case the federal district court extensively discussed the mutual mistake 
argument, as well as the impracticability and frustration of purpose arguments, that ALCOA had made seeking 
equitable modification of the terms of its contract with Essex Group, Inc. Id. at 53±78. The court there ruled that 
under Indiana law, each of these three theories provided a sufficient independent basis for granting ALCOA the 
relief sought. Id. at 70±72. The opinion provides a comprehensive and useful discussion of the several elements 
of each of these theories. See id. at 60±78. However, since the court upheld all three of these theories (apparently 
in anticipation of being subjected to close appellate review, id. at 70) the case unfortunately does not shed much 
light on the appropriate contours of the various approaches, on when one approach is likely to prove more 
promising than the others. As I will later discuss, however, the ALCOA opinion does discuss the ³material effect´
criterion of the mutual mistake defense, id. at 64±65, a topic that has some relevance for choosing between the 
two approaches. 
8. See, e.g., Murray v. Willistown Twp., 169 A.3d 84, 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (upholding a mutual mistake 
claim on appeal while noting that ³the issue here more closely resembles one of impracticability of 
performance´). 
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2019] MUTUAL MISTAKE OR EXCUSE 5 
addressing the equities of the situation than would be the other approach. These 
distinctions, however, are somewhat buried in ambiguous discussions contained in the 
Official Comments rather than featured more visibly and clearly in the text of the relevant 
Sections, and consequently they have received less scholarly and judicial attention than 
they perhaps merit. 
Let me start by setting out for comparison the text of Restatement (Second) Section 
152(1) that articulates the common law mutual mistake defense with the text of Section 
266(1) and (2) that sets forth the scope of the common law impracticability defense (and 
implicitly also the impossibility defense) and the frustration of purpose defense under 
supervening knowledge circumstances. 
B. Analysis of the Text of Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2) 
Section 152. When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract Voidable 
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of 
performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears 
the risk of mistake under the rule stated in Section 154.9
Section 266. Existing Impracticability or Frustration 
(1) :KHUHDWWKHWLPHDFRQWUDFWLVPDGHDSDUW\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHXQGHULWLVLPSUDFWLFDEOH
without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-
existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to 
render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the 
contrary. 
(2) :KHUH DW WKH WLPH D FRQWUDFW LV PDGH D SDUW\¶V SULQFLSOH SXUSRVH LV VXEVWDQWLDOO\
frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-
existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty of that 
party to render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate 
the contrary.10
Both the mutual mistake and the excuse defense approaches require the person 
seeking relief under supervening knowledge circumstances to satisfy the same three 
threshold elements. First, they each require that the non-existence of the relevant facts at 
the time of contracting was a basic assumption shared by both parties to the contract. 
Second, they each require that the party seeking relief is not at fault for not knowing that 
the relevant facts already existed at the time of contracting. Third, they each require that 
neither the contract language nor the surrounding circumstances indicate that the party 
seeking relief has assumed the risk of the relevant facts being in existence at the time of 
contracting.11 Failure to meet all three of these threshold requirements will bar a person 
from obtaining relief under either approach. So, assuming that all three of these threshold 
                                                          
 9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(1)±(2) .
 11. In his prominent contract law treatise, Allan Farnsworth takes the position that, with regard to these two 
approaches, ³it is more likely that a party will be regarded as having borne the risk of mistake than the risk of 
existing frustration.´ E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 607 (4th ed. 2004). See also Farnsworth, Brickell & 
Chawaga, supra note 5, at 27 (³[C]ourts are more likely to find that a party bore the risk of the disadvantage 
caused by a mutual mistake than that a party assumed the risk that performance would become impracticable.´). 
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6 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
elements are met under supervening knowledge circumstances, based on the text of these 
two Restatement (Second) Sections which of these two approaches is more likely to 
succeed as a basis for obtaining relief? 
The key concept for sorting this out is the principle of materiality. Once the threshold 
criteria noted above have been met, the remaining criterion for the mutual mistake defense 
XQGHU6HFWLRQLVWKDWWKHPLVWDNHKDYHD³PDWHULDOHIIHFWRQWKHDJUHHGH[FKDQJH´12
Each of the several excuse defenses also has its own required hardship criterion, in lieu of 
a materiality criterion, in addition to those three threshold criteria set forth above. Under 
Section 266(1), WKH UHPDLQLQJ FULWHULRQ LV WKDW WKH SDUW\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH EH UHQGHUHG
³LPSUDFWLFDEOH´13 and under Section 266(2), WKH UHPDLQLQJ FULWHULRQ LV WKDW WKHSDUW\¶V
³SULQFLSOHSXUSRVHLVVXEVWDQWLDOO\IUXVWUDWHG´14 There is an extensive body of case law 
regarding what must be demonstrated to satisfy each of these various criteria for being 
excused that I will not address in this brief essay, other than to here note that the several 
excuse defenses all have very demanding requirements.15 The question I will focus upon 
here is this: under these supervening knowledge circumstances when one or more of these 
excuse defenses is potentially available as an avenue for relief, is the mutual mistake 
approach also available as an alternative approach and, if so, under what circumstances 
would the mutual mistake approach be the more promising approach to pursue? 
³0DWHULDOLW\´ LV D UDWKHUSURWHDQ OHJDO FRQFHSW, one that takes different shapes in 
different contractual contexts. The usual unGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHSKUDVH³PDWHULDOFKDQJH´
under general commercial law16 or under securities law17 is that it refers to any change that 
is more than de minimis in impact, a very low threshold. On the other hand, the assessment 
DVWRZKHWKHUDSHUVRQ¶VIDLOure to fully perform a contractual obligation rises to the level 
RI D ³PDWHULDO EUHDFK´ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU WKHUH KDV EHHQ QRQ-
fulfillment of an implied-in-ODZFRQGLWLRQRI WKHRWKHUSDUW\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHREOLJDWLRQV
involves a complex, multi-factor analysis where in some instances even a significantly 
GHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFHPD\EHUHJDUGHGDVD³QRQ-PDWHULDOEUHDFK´18 The impracticability 
H[FXVHGHIHQVHLQFRQWUDVWXVXDOO\UHTXLUHVIDUPRUHWKDQVLPSO\³PDWHULDO´LQFUHDVHVLQ
                                                          
 12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(1). While Section 266 does not have a provision relating 
to supervening impossibility, presumably that situation is covered under Section 266(1) as an extreme form of 
impracticability where the increase in cost resulting from the relevant events is essentially infinite. 
 14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(2). 
 15. For discussion of the various criteria of the excuse defenses see, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 70±78. 
See also U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM¶N 2002) and the Official Comment to that section; 
Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Frustration of Contractual Purpose–Doctrine or Myth?, 70 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 239 
(1996); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207 (2009); 
Farnsworth, Brickell & Chawaga, supra note 5, at 6. 
 16. Consider, for example, UCC § 2-207, the ³battle of the forms´ provision. Under § 2-207(2)(b) an 
additional term in an expression of acceptance will not become part of the contract if it ³materially´ alters the 
contract, and Official Comments 4 and 5 to that Section make clear that the drafters here intended to impose a 
very low de minimis materiality threshold. 
 17. See., e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 444±49 (1976) (defining a ³material´ fact as one for 
which there need be only a substantial likelihood that it would have assumed actual significance in the 
deliberations of a reasonable shareholder). 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241, which assesses whether a party¶s failure to fully 
perform a contract obligation is ³material´ by a complex multi-factor analysis where the extent to which the 
deficient performance impairs the benefits obtained by the other party is only one factor to be considered. 
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2019] MUTUAL MISTAKE OR EXCUSE 7 
the cost of performance, as well as requiring a significant change in the nature of the 
required performance.19 The impossibility excuse defense is of course even more 
demanding as to the necessary impact of the relevant events upon performance. And the 
benefits that a SDUW\ H[SHFWV WRREWDLQ IURPD FRQWUDFW KDYH WREHQRW MXVW ³PDWHULDOO\´
reduced but instead drastically impaired, if not eliminated altogether, by an event for its 
LPSDFW WR EH UHJDUGHG DV VXIILFLHQW WR ³VXEVWDQWLDOO\ IUXVWUDWH´ D SHUVRQ¶V ³SULQFLSOH
purSRVH´20
The conclusion therefore suggested by comparing the texts of Sections 152(1) and 
266(1) and (2) is that the mutual mistake approach should probably be the preferred 
approach for seeking relief; even if an excuse defense may also be potentially available, 
GXH WR WKH OHVV VWULQJHQW ³PDWHULDOLW\´ UHTXLUHPHQW WKH PXWXDO PLVWDNH DSSURDFK ZLOO
dominate each of the excuse defenses with their more restrictive criteria under all 
circumstances in which both approaches meet the other threshold criteria.21 In other words, 
the mutual mistake approach will allow for a party to obtain relief in all supervening 
knowledge situations where relief could also be obtained on the basis of impracticability 
(or impossibility) under Section 266(1), or where relief would be available for frustration 
of purpose under Section 266(2), as well as providing relief under some circumstances 
where none of those excuse defenses would succeed. 
C. The Official Comments to Sections 152 and 266 
This conclusion, which is based solely upon a textual comparison of the two relevant 
Restatement (Second) Sections, is undercut to some extent, however, by the Official 
Comments to these Sections for a couple of reasons. First of all, Comment (c) to Section 
152 takes the positiRQWKDWIRUWKHUHWREHD³PDWHULDOHIIHFWXSRQWKHH[FKDQJH´IRUPXWXDO
PLVWDNHSXUSRVHVH[FHSWIRU³H[FHSWLRQDOFDVHV´22), the mistake must have an impact on 
both of the parties to the contract, not merely an impact only upon the person seeking relief 
as to the cost or nature or possibility of their performance even if that impact is very 
VXEVWDQWLDORUDVWRWKHDELOLW\RIWKHFRQWUDFWWRPHHWWKDWSHUVRQ¶VSULPDU\SXUSRVHVDJDLQ
without regard to the significance of this impact.23
The drafters of Section 152(1) apparently envisioned as the paradigm cases for 
defining the scope of the mutual mistake defense the two classic nineteenth century cases, 
                                                          
19. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also U.C.C. 
§ 2-615 cmt. 4; Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 243. 
 20. See Weiskopf, supra note 15, at 259. 
 21. ³[M]utual mistake . . . does not require the same level of loss [as does the impracticability excuse] to 
permit avoidance of the contract, i.e., mutual mistake only requires a material effect upon performance.´ JOHN 
EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 719 n.74 (5th ed. 2011). 
 22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) cmt. c, illus. 9 (stating, ³In such [ordinary] cases the 
materiality of the effect on the agreed exchange will be determined by the overall impact on both parties. In 
exceptional cases the adversely affected party may be able to show that the effect on the agreed exchange has 
been material simply on the ground that the exchange has become less desirable for him, even though there has 
been no effect on the other party. Cases of hardship that result in no advantage to the other party are, however, 
ordinarily appropriately left to the rules on impracticability and frustration. See Illustration 9 and Section 266.´)
(emphasis added). The Comment unfortunately does not clarify what would constitute an ³exceptional´ case 
where the mutual mistake defense could be asserted even where only one party has been impacted by the mistake. 
 23. Id.
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8 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
Sherwood v. Walker24 and Wood v. Boynton,25 where one of these cases allowed the 
defense26 and the other did not.27 In each of those cases the mutual mistake made as to the 
value of the goods at issue in setting the contract price impacted both the buyers and sellers 
of the goods, benefitting the buyers but injuring the sellers by an equal amount. But the 
mistakes made in these cases did not give rise to excuse defenses by the adversely 
impacted sellers because their performances of delivering the goods at issue were not 
rendered impossible nor impracticable, nor were their primary purposes substantially 
frustrated.28
Comment (c) specifically states that events that result in hardship to the party 
VHHNLQJ UHOLHIEXW WKDWGRQRWFRQIHUDQDGYDQWDJHXSRQ WKHRWKHUSDUW\DUH ³RUGLQDULO\
DSSURSULDWHO\OHIW WRWKHUXOHVRQLPSUDFWLFDELOLW\DQGIUXVWUDWLRQ´29 The Comment then 
presents an illustration that conveys the principle that if supervening knowledge of a fact 
substantially frustrates the purpose of one party, but does not impact the other party, then 
³WKH HIIHFW RQ WKH DJUHHG H[FKDQJHRISHUIRUPDQFHV LV QRWPDWHULDO´ and the adversely 
impacted party should instead seek relief under the Section 266(2) supervening frustration 
provision.30
This position presented in Comment (c) and elaborated upon by this illustration is 
an interesting idea as to the proper relationship of the mutual mistake and excuse defense 
approaches, giving each approach a distinct and well-defined scope of application, with 
there being relatively little overlap.31 The persuasiveness of this Illustration as a positive 
statement of the law, however, is uQGHUFXWE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH5HSRUWHU¶V1RWHWR6HFWLRQ
VWDWHVWKDWWKLVSDUWLFXODULOOXVWUDWLRQZDV³VXJJHVWHGE\Anderson Bros. v. O’Meara´32
The Reporter appears, however, to have unfortunately misread the holding of this case, 
which denied relief for mutual mistake on the basis that the mistake was unilateral rather 
than mutual, if there had been a mistake made at all,33 and not because the impact of a 
mutual mistake was only upon the party seeking relief. The Anderson Bros. case does not 
                                                          
 24. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (granting the seller relief on a mutual mistake defense 
theory). 
 25. Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wisc. 1885) (denying the seller relief sought on a mutual mistake defense 
theory). 
 26. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 925. 
 27. Wood, 25 N.W. at 45. 
28. But see ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 78 (1980) (holding that an event that will turn an expected profit into 
a substantial loss may justify a frustration of purpose defense). 
 29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The Comment 
unfortunately fails to elaborate as to what exceptional circumstances might justify departing from this ³ordinarily 
appropriate´ principle. 
 30. Id. at § 152, cmt. c, illus. 9. In my opinion the point made by this Illustration would be more clear if the 
Comment had taken the position that a mutual mistake that significantly impacts only one party to a contract 
does not qualify as a ³material effect on the agreed exchange,´ despite perhaps having a ³material´ impact, 
because a mistake with an effect on only one party even if ³material´ should not be regarded as having an impact 
³on the exchange.´ But the comment instead limits ³materiality´ itself only to those events having a significant 
impact upon both parties. 
31. But see ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 70 (the court held that the mutual mistake defense and the 
impracticability excuse defense and the frustration of purpose excuse defense all applied under those 
circumstances). 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, Reporter¶s Note to cmt. c; see Anderson Bros. v. 
O¶Meara, 306 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 33. Anderson, 306 F.2d at 677. 
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2019] MUTUAL MISTAKE OR EXCUSE 9 
hold, or evHQ ³VXJJHVW,´ WKDW WR EH UHJDUGHG DV D PXWXDO PLVWDNH MXVWLI\LQJ UHOLHI WKH
revelation of the unknown facts must impact both parties to the contract, and it is somewhat 
FRQFHUQLQJWKDWWKH5HSRUWHU¶V1RWHGRHVQRWUHIHUWRDQ\PRUHRQ-point case precedents 
that would support this proposition.34
The extent to which courts embrace this restrictive definition of materiality in the 
mutual mistake context that is suggested by Comment (c) is uncertain. The noted contract 
law scholar Allan Farnsworth was ambivalent on this point in his well-known single-
volume contract law treatise. He first stated broadly that a party seeking to assert a mutual 
PLVWDNHGHIHQVHKDVD³EHWWHUFKDQFH´RIHVWDEOLVKLQJPDWHULDOLW\LI³WKHPLVWDNHDOVRKDV
DQLPSDFWRQWKHRWKHUSDUW\´35 However, the only case that Farnsworth cited in support 
of this claim expresses agreement only in dicta in a ruling that denied the mutual mistake 
defense on assumption of risk grounds.36 Farnsworth also in his discussion cited a 
contrasting case that in hLVRSLQLRQ³VXSSRUWVWK>Hopposing] view that hardship for one 
SDUW\LVDVXIILFLHQWEDVLVIRUDYRLGDQFHIRUPLVWDNH´37 and called attention to the position 
taken in Comment (c) that even where a mutual mistake has had no impact on the other 
party to the contract, a person may be able to obtain mutual mistake relief under 
³H[FHSWLRQDO FDVHV´38 which are left undefined. He also noted more generally that the 
PXWXDOPLVWDNHFDVHV³DUHQRWPDUNHGE\WKHLUFRQVLVWHQF\LQHLWKHUUHDVRQLQJRUUHVXOW´39
                                                          
 34. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically rejected this interpretation of Comment (c) as 
requiring for a mutual mistake defense a showing that both parties to the contract are impacted by the mistake: 
³Rather, comment (c) [to Section 152] prescribes a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, in which either or 
both parties may be adversely affected by a mutual mistake.´ Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 728 F.3d 
832, 837 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 35.  
The party adversely affected [by a mutual mistake] has a better chance of showing that the effect on 
the agreed exchange is material if . . . the mistake also has an impact on the other party. Courts have 
been reluctant to allow avoidance if the mistake merely makes the exchange less desirable for one 
party . . . . [C]ases of [unilateral] hardship are ordinarily left to be dealt with under the rules on 
impracticability and frustration.  
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 607±08; see also MURRAY, supra note 21, at 494 (³If the discovered mistake 
reveals an exchange that is not only substantially less desirable for one party, but substantially more desirable 
for the other, a court will be more amenable to granting relief than if there is merely a loss to one party without 
a corresponding gain to the other.´). 
 36.  
A related distinction [to the mutual mistake versus assumption of risk grounds on which the case 
before the court was decided] is the manner in which the mistake«DIIHFWV WKH FRQWHPSODWHG
performance or the equivalence of value. To the extent that Alcoa [in the ALCOA case] was 
disadvantaged by the mistake, Essex [the other party to the contract] was enriched. Here, by contrast, 
while the unavailability of reprocessing has the effect of making performance by Westinghouse more 
expensive, it in no way enriches Florida [the other party to the contract], or gives Florida any benefit 
it did not bargain for. 
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va. 1981) (referred to by FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 608 n.19). 
 37. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 607 (³Case law supports this view that hardship for one party is a 
sufficient basis for avoidance for mistake.´); see also Dover Pool & Racquet Club v. Brooking, 322 N.E. 2d 168, 
171 (Mass. 1975) (³[A]s a result of the mistake enforcement of the contract would be materially more onerous 
to the purchaser than it would have been had the facts been as the parties believed them to be. The contract was 
therefore voidable by the purchaser . . . .´). 
38. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 607 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 1981)). 
39. Id. at 605. 
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10 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
Even under WKLV QDUURZ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ³PDWHULDO HIIHFW RQ WKH DJUHHG
H[FKDQJH´SKUDVLQJRI6HFWLRQDVUHTXLULQJ WKDWDPXWXDOPLVWDNHPXVWKDYHDQ
impact upon both parties to provide a basis for relief, there will still be some overlap 
between these two approaches. There are instances for which the events at issue, when 
they come to light, will not only have a material impact upon both parties but will also 
potentially meet the requirements of one or more excuse defenses,40 presenting the party 
seeking relief with a choice of approaches to pursue. As discussed above, a comparison of 
the texts of Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2) would appear to favor assertion of the 
mutual mistake defense as easier to establish in all circumstances where both that defense 
and an excuse defense are potentially available. 
However, Comment (c) to Section 152 not only suggests that an event must impact 
both parties to the contract to be material but also suggests that even where both parties 
are impacted, the materiality threshold for the mutual mistake defense should be set at a 
very high level. To the extent that the courts take this suggestion, it will be relevant for the 
choice of approaches because it will adversely impact the prospects for success with the 
mutual mistake approach. Specifically, Comment (c) states that for a person seeking relief 
WRVKRZWKLVPDWHULDOHIIHFW³>L@t is not enough for him to prove that he would not have 
made the contract had it not been for the mistake. He must show that the resulting 
imbalaQFHLQWKHH[FKDQJHLVVRVHYHUHWKDWKHFDQQRWEHIDLUO\UHTXLUHGWRFDUU\LWRXW´41
7KLVTXRWHIURPWKH&RPPHQWHTXDWHV³PDWHULDOHIIHFW´ZLWKD³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´
sufficient to make the exchange unfair, an extremely high materiality threshold when 
contrasted with the commonly applied and much less demanding standards of materiality 
LQRWKHUFRQWH[WVWKDW,KDYHQRWHGDERYH,IWKLVVWULQJHQW³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´PDWHULDOLW\
standard were to be widely embraced by the courts for resolving mutual mistake claims, 
this would greatly reduce or perhaps even eliminate altogether the gap between the 
³PDWHULDOHIIHFW´VKRZLQJUHTXLUHGIRUWKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHDQGWKHYHU\VXEVWDQWLDO
impacts that are required for the impracticability, impossibility, or frustration of purpose 
excuse defenses. However, other portions of Comment (c) undercut this call for consistent 
application of such a stringent materiality standard rather than applying the much less 
demanding materiality standards generally applied in commercial law or in securities law, 
or the broader but still less restrictive multi-factor standard for determining materiality in 
the implied-in-law contractual conditions context that is set forth in Section 241.42
Despite the ambivalent position taken by Comment (c) on the appropriate materiality 
WKUHVKROGDVXEVWDQWLDOQXPEHURIFRXUWVKDYHFLWHGDSSURYLQJO\WKLV³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´
                                                          
 40. ³In many of the cases that come under . . . Section [266], relief under the rules relating to mistake . . . will 
also be appropriate. . . . In that event the party entitled to relief may, of course, choose the ground on which he 
will rely.´ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266, cmt. a. See also, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 70±
72 (1980). 
 41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, cmt. c. 
 42. That Comment later significantly undercuts its recommendation for use of this stringent standard by 
broadly stating that ³[t]he standard of materiality here, as elsewhere in the Restatement (e.g. Section 237) is a 
flexible one to be applied in light of all the circumstances.´ Id. Comment (a) to Section 237 then refers the reader 
back to the broad, multi-factor determination of materiality set forth in Section 241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 237, cmt. a. 
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2019] MUTUAL MISTAKE OR EXCUSE 11 
language in ruling upon mutual mistake defense claims,43 as have some commentators,44
with some of these courts finding the claims before them to have met this stringent 
materiality standard,45 while a somewhat larger number of other courts have applied this 
standard but found it to not have been met,46 and still other courts have embraced this 
standard in dicta but have then resolved the mutual mistake claim presented to them on 
other grounds.47
D. Discussion of Comment (c) to Section 152 
The portion of Comment (c) to Section 152 that suggests that the scope of the mutual 
mistake defense should be restricted to circumstances where the events at issue have 
affected the benefits and burdens of the contract to both parties, and thereby relegate to 
the excuse defenses any claims for relief based upon supervening knowledge under 
circumstances where RQO\RQHSDUW\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRUDELOLW\WRKDYHWKHFRQWUDFWPHHW
their purposes, has been significantly impacted by those events, makes some sense as a 
categorization framework. This framework would clarify the scope of each approach and 
would greatly limit their areas of overlap, although both approaches would still be 
potentially available under those circumstances where the events at issue have 
significantly impacted both parties to the contract. But it would also raise some new 
concerns that are not addressed in the Comment. 
Under that suggested framework many, if not most, attempts to obtain judicial relief 
based upon supervening knowledge of an existing event would have to be argued as an 
                                                          
43. See, e.g., McKeever v. Warden, SCI-Grateford, 486 F.3d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 2007); Roers v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., 728 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Frownfelter, 626 F.3d 549, 556 (10th Cir. 
2010); ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64; Breeze v. United States, No. 2:03-CR-06, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9598, at 
*16 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Leading Edge Dev. Servs. v. EnXco, Inc., No. C05-3047-MWB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
92654, at *31 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Miami Valley Paper v. Lebbing Eng¶g & Consulting GBMH, No. 1:05-cv-702, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150333, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Roers v. Bank of Am., No. 10-cv-3107, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116725, at *39 (D. Minn. 2012); United States v. Thompson, No. 16-907, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32820, 
at *15 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Land Grantors in Henderson, Union v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 661, 706 (Fed. Cl. 
2005); Land Grantors v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 614, 627 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Land Grantors v. United States, 81 
Fed. Cl. 580, 605 (Fed. Cl. 2008); Stegen v. Hanson, No. 3-557/12-1980, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 776, at *8±9
(Iowa App. 2013); Hillside Ass¶n of Hollis v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 605 A.2d 1026, 1030 (N.H. 1992); City 
of Cape May v. Dash, No. A-1613-06T1, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1624, at *35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2008); Eteson v. Eteson, No. A-5148-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2547, at *13±14 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2011); Wrisley v. Krock, 2000 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 438, at *9 (Pa. Comm. Pleas Ct. 
2000); Pawtucket Lodge No. 4 v. City of Pawtucket, No. 84-5000, 1985 R.I. Super. LEXIS 160, at *7±8 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. 1985); Schildkamp v. Feed Commodities Int¶l, LLC, No. 16-205, 2016 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 238, at *10 
(Vt. 2016). 
 44. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 606 (citing approvingly the Comment (c) ³severe imbalance´
materiality criterion suggestion); MURRAY, supra note 21, at 494 (citing a case that quoted the ³severe 
imbalance´ language of Comment (c)). 
45. See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64; Land Grantors in Henderson, 64 Fed. Cl. at 706±07; Land 
Grantors, 81 Fed. Cl. at 606; Hillside Ass’n of Hollis, 605 A.2d at 1030; Pawtucket Lodge, 1985 R.I. Super. 
LEXIS 160, at *8. 
46. See, e.g., Thompson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32820, at *25; Schildkamp, 2016 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 238, at 
*11; Stegen, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 776, at *15±16; Roers v. Bank of Am., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116725, at 
*41; Eteson, 2011 NJ Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2547, at *13; Frownfelter, 626 F.3d at 556; City of Cape May, 2008 
N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1624, at *35; McKeever, 486 F.3d at 86. 
47. See, e.g., Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, 728 F.3d at 836; Breeze, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9598, at 
*18; Land Grantors, 71 Fed. Cl. at 626; Wrisley, 2000 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 438, at *17. 
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12 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
excuse defense because only the adversely affected party was impacted by the event, and 
no advantage was conferred on the other party by the event. This limitation of the scope 
of the mutual mistake defense would reduce litigation costs in that it would spare the 
person seeking relief under those circumstances from the burden of having to argue and 
prove each of two alternative theories to fully make their case for relief, and would 
consequently also similarly reduce the burden on the court in resolving this issue. On the 
other hand, judicial acceptance of this framework would very sharply curtail the 
availability of the mutual mistake defense. Those persons who can establish that an event 
unknown to the parties at the time of contracting has materially and adversely impacted 
them, but who cannot demonstrate that the event has also benefitted the other party, would 
then have to show that the event has had sufficient adverse impact upon them to render 
their performance impossible or impracticable, or to partially frustrate their primary 
purpose, very demanding requirements, or they will be denied relief.48
Comment (c) to Section 152 also raises the question of how significant the impact 
of a mutual mistake must be on a person before that person can obtain relief from their 
contractual obligations on that basis. However, even if the Section 152(1) requirement for 
WKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHWKDWWKHPLVWDNHKDYHD³PDWHULDOHIIHFWRQWKHH[FKDQJH´LV
LQWHUSUHWHGDVWKH&RPPHQWVRPHZKDWDPELYDOHQWO\UHFRPPHQGVDVLPSRVLQJD³VHYHUH
LPEDODQFH´VWDQGDUGUDWKHUWKDQHLWKHUWKe much less stringent materiality criteria usually 
applied under commercial law or securities law, or the also less stringent Section 241 
multi-factor criteria for finding materiality in the implied-in-law conditions context, that 
harsher materiality standard still appears to be less demanding than the onerous eligibility 
criteria that must be met to successfully invoke either the impossibility, impracticability 
RUIUXVWUDWLRQRISXUSRVHH[FXVHGHIHQVHV,PSRVLWLRQRID³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´PDWHULDOLW\
criterion would therefore appear to still leave the mutual mistake approach at least 
modestly more attractive than the excuse defense approach under those circumstances in 
which a person might arguably qualify for relief under either approach. 
III. CONCLUSION 
When a person seeks judicial relief from their contractual obligations on the basis 
that the parties to the contract were not aware of facts existing at the time of contracting, 
through no fault of their own, and those facts when later revealed have made thaWSHUVRQ¶V
performance arguably either impracticable or impossible, or have arguably partially 
frustrated their primary purpose in entering into the contract, the text of Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2) viewed in isolation suggests that 
both the mutual mistake defense and one or another of the excuse defenses will each be 
available as plausible argumentative approaches, and that the mutual mistake defense will 
generally be easier to establish because the materiality of the mistake will usually be less 
                                                          
 48. Whether the scope of mutual mistake relief should be so limited is a larger question that is not addressed 
by Comment (c), and that I will also not address in this brief essay. I am here focusing solely on the scope of 
application and relative attractiveness of the mutual mistake and excuse defense approaches for seeking relief 
under supervening knowledge circumstances, given the eligibility contours that courts are in fact likely to apply 
for each of these approaches, and not on the more theoretical and more difficult question of the proper eligibility 
criteria that should be applied for each approach. 
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difficult to establish than would be the more demanding criteria of each of the excuse 
defenses. 
&RPPHQW F WR 6HFWLRQ  KRZHYHU JRHV ZHOO EH\RQG WKH 6HFWLRQ¶V WH[W LQ
suggesting two limitations on the scope of the mutual mistake defense that would make 
the choice of approach to pursue for relief more complicated. That Comment first suggests 
that the mutual mistake defense should be limited in its application to only those 
circumstances where the facts that later come to light impact the benefits and burdens of 
the contract to both parties, and in general should not be allowed under those 
circumstances where the facts, when revealed, have a material impact on one party 
SRVVLEO\ VXEVWDQWLDO HQRXJK WR UHQGHU WKDW SDUW\¶V SHrformance impossible or 
LPSUDFWLFDEOH RU SDUWLDOO\ IUXVWUDWH WKDW SDUW\¶V SULPDU\ SXUSRVH LQ HQWHULQJ LQWR WKH
contract, but that do not affect the value of the contract to the other party. That Comment 
essentially calls for a requirement that a mutual mistake have a material effect on both 
SDUWLHVLHDPDWHULDOHIIHFW³RQWKHH[FKDQJH´UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\DPDWHULDOLPSDFWRQ
the person seeking relief. 
If this limit on the scope of the mutual mistake defense was judicially embraced, it 
would clarify in most instances which of these two approaches were a more suitable basis 
for relief, given the circumstances, although in some instances both approaches for seeking 
relief would still be available.49 But adoption of this limiting principle would do more than 
simply provide clarification as to which approach was more appropriate. It would also 
severely restrict the availability of the mutual mistake defense under circumstances where 
the facts, when revealed, materially impact only one party to the contract, and where the 
impact is not sufficient for that person to meet the stringent excuse defense criteria. Absent 
a judicial consensus that the scope of the mutual mistake defense should be so sharply 
curtailed, it would probably be preferable to develop some other criterion for determining 
when a contracting party who seeks relief based on supervening knowledge of existing 
facts should pursue a mutual mistake approach, and when they should instead seek to 
invoke an excuse defense. 
Whether or not the mutual mistake defense is interpreted to require that both parties 
be impacted by the mistake, in those supervening knowledge instances, where either the 
mutual mistake or the excuse defense approach arguably meets the requisite criteria, the 
question remains as to which approach would be more promising to the party seeking 
relief. The text of the relevant Restatement (Second) Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2), 
as discussed above, suggest that the mutual mistake approach will dominate the excuse 
defense approach under all circumstances of supervening knowledge.50 However, one 
portion of Comment (c) to Section 152 somewhat ambivalently suggests a second 
OLPLWDWLRQRQWKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHDOLPLWDWLRQWKDWWKH³PDWHULDOHIIHFW´FULWHULRQ
should require a showing of D³VHYHUH LPEDODQFH´RIDPDJQLWXGHVXIILFLHQW WRPDNH LW
unfair to hold the adversely impacted person to their contractual obligation. This strict 
criterion, which as I have noted has been embraced by a significant number of courts,51
would sharply limit the advantage of pressing the mutual mistake approach for relief over 
                                                          
49. See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 65. 
50. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, 27±28. 
51. See citations, supra note 46. 
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14 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
attempting to satisfy any of the excuse defenses with their strict requirements. But it would 
not entirely eliminate that advantage given how difficult those excuse defense criteria are 
to meet. 
In overall conclusion, the mutual mistake defense should probably be advanced at 
least as an alternative ground for relief in any instance where one is seeking to be excused 
IURP RQH¶V FRQWUDFWXDO REOLJDWLRQV RQ WKH EDVLV RI LPSRVVLELOLW\ LPSUDFWicability or 
frustration of purpose as a result of supervening knowledge. There does not appear to be 
any significant downside risk of doing so.52 The mutual mistake approach certainly will 
have a substantial advantage over the excuse defense approach if the reviewing court does 
QRWUHTXLUHDVKRZLQJRILPSDFWXSRQERWKSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQWUDFWWRPHHWWKH³PDWHULDO
HIIHFWRQ WKHH[FKDQJH´UHTXLUHPHQWRIWKLVDSSURDFK$QGHYHQLIDUHVWULFWLYH³VHYHUH
LPEDODQFH´PDWHULDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWLVLPSRVHGE\WKHFRXUt, as will often be the case, this 
will still probably be an easier showing to make than satisfying the very demanding 
requirements of either the impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purposes 
defenses. 
                                                          
 52. As a matter of argumentative strategy, however, pleading a very weak argument, even only as an 
alternative ground for recovery, may possibly distract a court from focusing on and recognizing the merits of the 
stronger arguments that one is presenting. A decision should be made as to whether such secondary arguments 
that can be pleaded in the alternative are plausible enough to avoid tainting by association the primary theories 
being advanced. 
